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FISCAL ADJUSTMENTS IN OECD
COUNTRIES : COMPOSITION AND
MACROECONOMIC EFFECTS
ABSTRACT
This paper studies how the composition of fiscal adjustments influences their likelihood of
“success,” defined as a long lasting deficit reduction, and their macroeconomic consequences. We
find thatfiscal adjustments which rely primarily on spending cuts on transfers and the government
wage bill have a better chance of being successful and are expansionary. On the contrary fiscal
adjustments which rely primarily on tax increases and cuts in public investment tend not to last and
are contractionary.
We discuss alternateexplanations for these findings by studying both a full sample of OECD
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New York, NY 10027I. Introduction
In the last two decades the debt to GDP ratios of many OECD countries
has increased to levels ”historically observed only in the aftermath of
major wars, as Table 1 documents.
The policymakers of countries with fiscal problems face several
critical questions: (i) how large should the fiscal adjustment be,
(ii) should one cut expenditures or raise revenues and, more specifically,
which components of spending and revenues should one adjust, (iii) will the
fiscal consolidation last or will it be reversed and higher deficits will
soon reappear, and, finally, (iv) will the fiscal adjustment cause a
recession?
The purpose of this paper is to make progress, well beyond our initial
results in Alesina and Perotti (1995a, 1996), toward answering these
questions. The critical point which we stress in this paper is that all the
above questions are deeply interconnected. For instance, the composition of
the fiscal adjustment influences both the likelihood of achieving a
permanent consolidation of the budget and the macroeconomic consequences of
the fiscal consolidation.
We identify two different types of fiscal adjustments. “Type 1“ relies
primarily on expenditure cuts, and, in particular, on cuts in transfers,
social security and government wages and employment. Tax increases are a
small fraction of the total adjustment and, in particular, taxes on
households are not raised at all or are even reduced. On the contrary
“Type 2“ adjustments rely mostly on broad based tax increases, and often the
largest increases are on taxes on households and social security contribu-
tions . On the expenditure side almost all the cuts are on public
investment, while government wages, employment, and transfers are completely
untouched, or only slightly affected. We find that even when the two types
of adjustments have the same size, in terms of reduction of primary
deficits, Type 1 adjustments induce a more lasting consolidation of the
budget and are expansionary, while Type 2 adjustments are soon reversed by
further deteriorations of the budget and have contractionary consequences on
the economy.
The reason why t~e 1 adjustments are more permanent is that they
tackle the two items of the budget, government wages and welfare programs
which have the strongest tendency to automatically increase, and, in fact,
have been increasing in the last three decades as a share of total
government spending. ~ Concerning the macroeconomic consequences of the
two types of adjustments, the literature, which we review below, has
generally focused on credibility effects and wealth effects of fiscal
adjustments on consumption, We also emphasize the effects of fiscal policy
on unit labor costs and competitiveness. In fact, we suggest, although we
~ See Tanzi and Schuknecht (1995) for a discussion of the transformation
of the composition of government budgets in OECD countries in the last
century.-2-
Table’ 1. Public Debt in OECD Countries































































































Source: OECD , Debt is gross as a share of GNP.
~ 1970.-3-
do not have definite evidence, that the unit labor cost channel may even be
more empirically relevant than the wealth effects and credibility channels
on consumption.
This paper is organized as follows. Section II critically reviews several
theoretical argwents on the contractionary or expansionary effects of
fiscal adjustments. Section III discusses problems of cyclical adjustments
of fiscal variables, and presents the procedure which we use. Section IV
presents the empirical evidence on fiscal adjustments in a sample of 20
OECD countries for the period 1960 to 1994. Section V analyzes three
countries as examples of Type 1 and Type 2 adjustments; the cases are
Ireland, Denmark and Italy. The last section concludes.
II. Contractionary or Expansionary Fiscal
Consolidations : The Theorv
1. Kewesian effects
The standard keynesian argument is that a fiscal contraction has a
temporary contractionary effect through an aggregate demand channel, in a
model with sticky prices and wages. A standard multiplier effect implies
that spending cuts are more recessionary than tax increases.
2. ExDansionarv effects of fiscal contractions: the demand side
a. Wealth effects on consumption
A cut in government spending, if perceived as long lasting, implies a“
permanent reduction in the future tax burden of consumers, generating a
positive wealth effect.
Even tax increases can have expansionary effects on consumption.
Blanchard (1990) argues that a tax increase today can have expansionary
effects if it generates the expectations of less dramatic and disruptive tax
increases tomorrow. Also, by resolving uncertainty about the course of
future fiscal policy it may reduce precautionary savings.
Blanchard’s argument is an example of what Bertola and Drazen (1993)
characterize as the “expectation view of fiscal policy. ” That is, in an
intertemporal model of consumption behavior, the effects of current fiscal
policy depend on what expectations it generates on the course of future
fiscal policy. In their words “a policy innovation that would be contrac-
tionary in a static model may be expansionary if it induces sufficiently
strong expectations of future policy changes in the opposite direction.n
Bertola and Drazen (1993) consider a model where government spending
follows a random walk with a positive drift and national income is (for
simplicity) constant. Bertola and Drazen arguer realistically, that
stabilizations often have a discrete character, That is, even if public
debt accumulates rapidly, political constraints often delay the adoption of-4-
the appropriate stabilization policies. ~ However, because of the
feasibility constraint, sooner or later a stabilization will have to occur.
Call g= the ratio of government spending over GDP at which with probability
p a stabilization occurs, where “stabilization” is a sharp drop in spending.
If the stabilization does not occur at gc, then it will occur with certainty
later, when spending over GDP reaches a much higher level g. At that point,
spending is set below g= so that, again, with probability p a stabilization
may again occur at g=.
The model implies that at low levels of government spending, private
consumption falls less than one-to-one with increases in government
spending: this is because an increase in spending implies that a
stabilization may come soon. Thus, higher government spending only
partially crowds out private demand, a typical keynesian result, obtained in
a fully neoclassical model. When the economy reaches gc, if the stabiliza-
tion occurs, private consumption jumps up reflecting the wealth effect or
reduced expected future taxes. With probability l-p, however, the
stabilization does not occur. In this case consumption jumps down because
the public realizes that political constraints will delay the stabilization.
Thus , a failed stabilization has a contractionary effect because it signals
the lack of political commitment to a “serious” attempt at reducing
spending.
Bertola and Drazen’s point is consistent with arguments put forward by
Giavazzi and Pagano (1996). They argue that large fiscal contractions can
be expansionary precisely because they signal a permanent and decisive
change in the stance of fiscal policy, while small adjustments may have the
opposite effect for the opposite reason. The “small” adjustments in ~
Giavazzi and Pagano’s words can be interpreted as an example of the failed
stabilization at trigger point gc, using the terminology of Bertola and
Drazen.
Sutherland (1995) considers the effects of a stabilization in”a model
where consumers have finite lives, as in Blanchard(1985) . Each consumer
faces a constant probability of death in every period of his life, thus the
model does not imply Ricardian properties even with nondistortionary taxes
and transfers. As in Bertola and Drazen (1993) the government is on an
unstable fiscal path and a stabilization sooner or later has to occur. At
low level of debt the model displays keynesian features. This is because
the stabilization is expected to occur in the distant future, when many of
the current consumers will be dead. These consumers do not internalize
fully the future increase in taxation. As debt increases, the model
~/ For instance, Alesina and Drazen (1991) model this delay as a result
of a war of attrition between groups disagreeing on how to share the burden
of the stabilization, so that time is necessary to resolve the political
stalemate .-5-
displays anti-keynesian”features, namely an increase in the fiscal deficit
is contractionary. This is because current consmers expect that a
stabilization will occur relatively soon, when they are still alive.
One problem with the expectation view is that the critical variable
driving the results is the effect of current policies on the public’s
expectation about future policy changes, a variable which is intrinsically
not observable. A devil’s advocate might argue that any behavior of private
consumption following any type of fiscal policy can be rationalized by an
appropriate assumption about what the current fiscal policy signals about
the not observable future policies. For instance, a generally accepced
assumption in this literature is that a large spending cut signals a
permanent change in the stance of fiscal policy. However, one may argue
just the opposite. Suppose that a large spending cut threatens the
political survival of a government committed to fiscal austerity, than a
spending cut which is too large may imply a future relaxation of fiscal
policy following an electoral defeat of the current govement. While we do
not particularly subscribe to this argument, the point is that the expecta-
tion view suffer from an embarrassment of riches; namely, it is consistent
with too many possible empirical obsenations.
A second channel for wealth effects arises from a fall in interest
rates which may accompany a fiscal adjustment. Lower interest rates imply a
higher market value of private wealth.
b. Credibility effects
A fiscal consolidation, particularly a strong one in a high debt
country, may have important credibility effects on interest rates by
reducing risk premia. The latter can be of two types: (i) inflation risk
premia or (ii) default or consolidation risk premia. Default risk may be
trivial for relatively low debt countries, but may become significant for
high debt ones. ~
A decisive discrete change in the fiscal policy stance may have a
significant credibility effect on interest rates which would crowd in
private investment and consumption of durable foods. For instance Miller,
Skidelsky, and Weller (1990) consider a model with a threshold above which
the government is forced to impose a tax on bond holders. With random
shocks on the level of debt, as the debt level approaches that threshold,
the risk premium increases, leading to a fall in private demand. A decisive
~ For some empirical discussion of default risk premia in high debt OECD
countries see Alesina, De Broek, Prati, and Tabellini (1992). They show
that a rough measure of default risk is not influenced by the level of the
debt/GDP ratio at low levels of debt, but it is affected by it at high
levels of debt.-6-
stabilization which reduces the debt level well below the threshold,
eliminates the risk premium, crowding in the components of private demand
particularly sensitive co interest rates.
Along similar lines, Alesina, Prati, and Tabellini (1990) show that at
high level of debt, particularly if the debt has short maturity, self-
fulfilling confidence crises may materialize. If a crisis occurs and the
public is not willing to roll over the debt, the government is forced to tax
bond holders or default. A reduction in the level of the debt, and a
lengthening of its maturity, reduces the risk of confidence crises and thus
the associates risk premia. This is a model which displays multiple
equilibria for some levels of debt/GDP ratios. Thus , a fiscal adjustment
which reduces the debt below the level where q ultiple equilibria are
possible, may have large discrete effects on the risk premia.
As for the case of the “expectation theory” on consumption behavior,
however, this argument also relies on a variable; namely, “credibility of
the adjustment” which is ex ante not observable. That is, it is not a
priori obvious what makes an adjustment credible or not. However, Giavazzi
and Pagano (1990) in their study of the Danish and Irish stabilization in
the eighties report some suggestive evidence in favor of both the
expectation view and the credibility effects. They show that standard
wealth effects on consumption, and real interest rate effects on investment
are not sufficient co explain the consumption and investment growth in these
two countries during their fiscal adjustment.
c. Supply-side effects
(1) Labor SUDDIV: neoclassical effects
While wealth effects on consumption from permanent reductions in
government spending are expansionary on the demand side, the same wealth
effects may reduce labor supply (Barro (1991). If both consumption and
leisure are normal goods, a wealthier individual will want to consume more
of both, therefore he will work less. In addition, the induced higher real
wages by reducing Tobin’ q may crowd out investment (Baxter and King
(1993)).
The standard substitution effect suggests that tax increases should
reduce work effort and labor supply. Higher labor income taxes reduce labor
supply . Thus , a permanent spending cut financed by a tax cut has two
opposite effects on labor supply. The wealth effect reduces it, che
substitution effect increases it.
In the case of a temporary cut in government spending, the wealth
effect should be small and the substitution effect relatively large. Thus
for temporary spending cuts the substitution effect should predominate, for
permanent spending cuts the wealth effect should dominate. However, Baxter
and King (1993) argue that their simulation shows that the financing side of
the government budget (i.e., how the spending cut is financed with or-7-
without distortionary t’axes) is more important for its macroeconomic impact
on supply than its duration. Empirically, however, both the wealth effect
and the substitution effect on individual labor supply are likely to be
small. ~
(2) Labor market structure
While the effect of taxes on individual labor supply may be small,
their effects on aggregate labor supply in unionized labor markets may be
much larger. With unionized labor markets a permanent increase in labor
taxation shifts the union’s aggregate supply of labor because it decreases
the after tax income of employed union members at any before tax wage. In
other words, an increase in labor taxation leads the union to demand higher
real wages to compensate for the decreased after tax income.
Building on work by Calmfors and Driffil (1988), Alesina and Perotti
(1994) show that this effect depend on the structure of labor markets. The
effect is weak in countries with decentralized labor markets (like the
United States or Canada) and is also relatively weak in countries with
highly centralized unions where highly union-government negotiations
internalize the entire fiscal maneuver. That is, at the bargaining
table centralized union will take into consideration the spending side of
the government budget as well; thus, for instance, the union will
internalize the effects of higher taxes on more public goods or higher
transfers. On the contrary, the effect of labor taxation on unit labor cost
is highest in countries were union are strong enough to pass on tax
increases to wages but not encompassing enough to internalize the connection
between taxes and benefits of the fiscal maneuver. For example, Alesina and
Perotti (1994) calculate that in the countries in the intermediate group an
increase of the income tax of 1 percent of GNP causes an increase in
relative unit labor costs of about 2 percent.





firms, influencing their competitiveness.
Whv composition matters v
previous discussion has highlighted that tax increases or spending
have very different effects. Several additional reasons suggest
that even the composition of spending cuts may have important consequences
on how permanent the fiscal adjustment is and on its macroeconomic
consequences. One can identify at least three reasons why the composition
of cuts may matter.
~/ See for instance Pencavel (1986). For a general treatment of the
neoclassical approach to fiscal policy see Barro (1989).
~/ For a discussion of composition effects on fiscal adjustments see also
Perotti (1996a).-8-
(i) Expectation effect: Different types of spending cuts may be more
or less permanent by their nature. Consider two types of spending cuts of
the same magnitude. The first one relies only on a reduction in public
investment, for instance in maintenance of public infrastructures. The
second one includes cuts in welfare obtained by changes in eligibility
criteria for transfer programs and by cuts in government employment. Even
though the two types of spending cuts may have the same “impact” magnitude,
clearly the second one has more lasting effects than the first, In fact
maintenance of public infrastructure cannot be posrponed forever; on the
contrary, structural changes in the parameters which determine the extent
of the coverage of the “welfare state” by influencing the dynamic of
entitlement have long lasting effects. Thus, according to this argument,
the composition, much more than the size per se, influences expectations
about future the future stance of fiscal policy, a critical point of the
expectation view.
(ii) Political credibility effect: Governments which are willing to
tackle the politically more delicate components of the budgets, public
employment, social security, welfare programs, may signal that they are
really “serious” about the fiscal adjustment. Not every government has the
necessary strength to tackle these politically difficult issues.
Typically, coalition governments lack the necessary cohesion to implement
this type of adjustment, as shown by Alesina and Perotti (1995a). ~ In
fact, coalition governments succumb to intercoalition conflicts concerning
the distributional consequences of the adjustment. ~ On the contrary,
single party governments may have the necessary strength to cut transfers,
social security programs, and the government wage bill. ~
(iii) Labor market effect: Cuts in the government wage bill may have
different effects than cuts in non wage government consumption. Lane and
Perotti (1996) show that a fall in government employment shifts the
aggregate demand for labor facing the union, thus improving profitability
through two channels: a fall in unit labor costs, and a depreciation of the
exchange rate in a flexible exchange system. On the contrary, a cut in
nonwage government consumption does not have these effects because, at least
up to a first degree of approximation, the private and the public sectors
have the same propensity to spend on the goods and services which enter in
the definition of nonwage goverment consumption. They present empirical
~ This result is consistent with previous empirical results by Roubini
and Sachs (1989) and Grilli, Masciandaro, and Tabellini (1990) which suggest
that coalition governments are less fiscally responsible.
~/ A model of “war of attrition” among coalition members may rationalize
this effect; see Alesina and Drazen (1991) and Spolaore (1993). For a
similar argument based upon a “tragedy of the common” game see Velasco
(1994) .
~/ According to the results by Alesina and Perotti (1995a) both left
leaning and right leaning governments have been able in about equal pro-
portion to achieve successful fiscal stabilization.-9-
evidence on a sample of”OECD countries which shows that the composition of
spending cuts strongly influences labor market variables, in the direction
described above.
The composition of tax increases may also influence the macroeconomic
consequences of fiscal adjustment. For instance, Alesina and Perotti (1994
and 1995b) show that taxes on household and social security contributions
have the largest impact on relative unit labor costs, via union behavior.
III. Fiscal Impulse: Cvclical Adjustment
We are interested in discretionary changes in the fiscal position of a
country. Thus we need a qeasure of a fiscal impulse, defined the discre-
tionary change in the government budget balance. For this reason we focus
upon primary deficits rather than total deficits, since fluctuations in
interest payments cannot be considered discretionary, unless extraordinary
measures (default, consolidation) are taken.
The second, more difficult, issue concerns the cyclical correction.
One need to isolate the discretionary change in the primary deficit, defined
as the difference between the actual change in the deficit and the change
that would have occurred, had the policymakers done nothing. Clearly the
problem is to define what doing nothing means. For instance it may mean that
certain spending programs remain constant in nominal terms at last year
level, or constant in real terms, or constant in share of GDP, etc. The
following brief discussion highlights some possible methodologies: it goes
beyond the scope of the present paper to provide a comprehensive discussion
of the issue of cyclical adjustment. u
The simplest approach to cyclical corrections, is simply to ignore the
problem and just consider changes in the primary balance as a measure of
fiscal impulse. The great advantage of this measure is its simplicity and
transparency. Its disadvantage, of course, is that it ignores the effects on
the budget of cyclical fluctuations of growth and unemployment.
A second measure, t~ically used by the OECD, defines the fiscal
impulse as the difference between the current primary deficit and the
primary deficit which would have prevailed if expenditures in the previous
year had grown with potential GDP and revenues with actual GDP. This
approach relies on potentially questionable measures of potential output.
A third measure, used by the IMF, is similar to the OECD one but
assumes as a benchmark year not the previous one but a reference year when
output was supposed to be at its potential level.
~/ For overviews see McKenzie (1989), and Perotti (1996b).-1o-
In this paper, as in Alesina and Perotti (1995a) we use a fourth
measure proposed by Blanchard (1993), which maintains much simplicity and
transparency, while, at the same time, provides an attractive cyclical
correction . Essentially this measure implies a calculation of how the
government budget would be if unemployment had not changed from the previous
year. Specifically, this cyclical adjustment is an attempt at eliminating
from the budget changes in taxes and transfer associated with changes in the
unemployment rate.
There is no perfect cyclical correction, and in fact different
approaches may lead to non trivial or even systematic differences. For
example, Perotti (1996b) compares the OECD measure and the Blanchard measure
and concludes that the OECD measure systematically overestimate the amount
of discretionary component relative to the ~lanchard measure when the
deficit falls, and underestimates the amount of discretionary component when
the deficit increases. This author also shows that the differences in the
two measures ar far from trivial in certain cases.
We use a simple implementation of the Blanchard’s measure constructed
as follows: for each country we regress transfers as a share of GDp
(TWSF) on two time trends (1960-75) and (1976-94) and the unemployment
rate (U).
TRANSFt - a. + al TREND1 + a2 TREND2 + a3 Ut + Et (1)
Define ~o, al, ~2, and A3 the estimated parameters of equation (1) and
A
Et the estimated residual. We then compute what the variable TRANSF would
have been in period t, if the unemplo~ent rate had remained constant
between (t-1) and t:
TWSFt(Ut.l) - ;0 + :1 TREND1 + :2 TREND2 + 13 Ut.l + ~t (2)
We follow the same procedure to adjust tax revenues, defined as
Tt(ut-l). Using TWSFt(Ut.l), together with all the other components of
spending and Tt(Ut.l), we compute our measure of cyclically adjusted primary
deficits. ~ Our measure of the fiscal impulse is then constructed as the
difference between the cyclically adjusted primary deficit in period t and
the same variable in period t-1, all in shares of GDP. We sometimes refer
to this fiscal impulse variable as “BFI”, for “Blanchard Fiscal Impulse.”
Several reasons justify our choice for a cyclical correction. First, we
find its simplicity attractive. This measure does not rely on possibly
questionable and sometimes obscure measures of potential output or base
years. Second, this simplicity does not come at a high price for us. In
fact, since our focus is on large changes in che fiscal stance, cyclical
factors typically should not play a major role. Clearly, one can think of
exceptional circumstances when major exogenous shocks have caused large
1/ See the appendix in Alesina and Perotti (1995a) for details.-11-
changes in budget defic”its,but these are probably the exception more than
the rule. Third, current work by McDermott and Wescoct (1996) pursuing a
similar research strategy to ours, adopts the OECD cyclical correction,
therefore it is useful to use a different approach to check on the robust-
ness of results. Finally, sensitivity analysis using different cyclical
corrections suggests that the qualitative nature of our result is quite
robust.
IV. Fiscal Adjustments in OECD Countries
1. Definitions , sample, and basic statistics
We consider a sample of 20 OECD countries for the period 1960 to 1994,
The countries are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy Japan, Netherlands, Nomay,
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and United States.
Our definition of “government” is general government, as defined by the OECD
which is our data source. We have 378 usable obsenations. We have
excluded all the country-years for which a complete set of data needed for
our tests was not available.
We focus upon periods of very tight fiscal policy. In particular, we
consider relatively large budget adjustments, for two reasons. First, by
considering large policy changes, we are less likely to be unduly influenced
by cyclical factors. Second, macroeconomic and composition effects are more
likely to be detectable in the case of large adjustments. We use the
following definition of a tight fiscal policy:
Definition 1: A period of tight fiscal policy is a year when BFI falls
by more than 1.5 per cent of GDP or a period of two consecutive years in
which BFI falls by at least 1.25 per cent per year in both years.
This definition allows for both a yearly definition of an adjustment
and two-year definition. In Alesina and Perotti (1995a) we considered only
“one year” adjustments. That procedure implies counting as several
different adjustments, a sequence of a multiyear adjustment program. In
Alesina and Perotti (1996) we considered a few multiyear “cases. With this
two-year definition we strike a balance between the two. While there is a
certain degree of arbitrariness in this choice, like in any alternative, we
show below, by reviewing related literature and performing sensitivity
tests, that the nature of our results is not unduly sensitive to this
particular definition.
Table 2 shows that, on average, the fiscal impulse is close to zero.
However this is the result of significant increases in primary expenditures
and revenues, of more than 0,3 percent of GDP per year. This observation
reflects the well-known “growth of government” occurred in the last several
decades in OECD countries. In our sample we have 62 years of tight fiscal-12-
policy, with an average improvement in the BFI of more than 2.5 per cenc of
GDP . This reduction in deficits is about equally distributed between higher
taxes and lower spending.
Table 2. Tight Fiscal Policy: Primary Expenditures and Revenues ~
Number of Fiscal Primary
Observations Impulse Expenditures Revenues
All sample 378 -0.07 0.32 0.38
(0.09) (0.09) (0.06)
Tight 62 -2.57 -1.34 1.22
(0.20) (0.23) (0.15)
Source: OECD .
~ All the variables are in changes of ratios over GDP. Standard
deviations in parentheses.
We now need a definition of “success.”
Definition 2: A period of tight fiscal policy is successful if one of
the two following conditions applies: (i) in the three years after the
tight period the ratio of the cyclically adjusted primary deficit over GDP
is on average at least 2 percent of GDP below the last year of the tight
period; (ii) three years after the last year of the tight period the debt to
GDP ratio is 5 percent of GDP below the level of the last year of the tight
period.
This definition allows for both a measure of success on the stock of
debt and a measure on the flow of cyclically adjusted primary deficits.
This definition is quite demanding, nevertheless about a fourth of tight
policies are successful, Table 3 lists all the cases of successful adjust-
ments: we have 13 episodes, for a total of 16 obsenration/years. As we-13-
discuss below our results are not unduly sensitive to reasonable changes in
this definition. In particular, we illustrate below results obtained with a
much more lenient definition of success, u

























For cases of two-year adjustments we indicate the second year.
Success and composition
Table 4 shows that successful adjustments are slightly larger in terms
of fiscal impulse than unsuccessful ones: the difference is about 0.5 of
GDP . While this difference is not trivial, more striking differences appear
in the composition. In successful cases (16 observation years) about
73 percent of the adjustment is on the spending side; in unsuccessful cases
(46 obsenation years) about 44 percent of the adjustment is on the
expenditure side.
Even more striking are the differences in,composition of different
types of spending and sources of revenue. Tables 5 and 6 consider a
breakdown of the spending side in its major components. In unsuccessful
cases more than two thirds of the cuts are on capital spending while
everything else, particularly government wages, are virtually untouched. In
successful cases cuts in capital expenditures are actually much lower in
~/ One may argue that a definition of success should allow for difference
across countries based upon initial conditions. However, one would make the
data coo diffuse and impossible to analyze by allowing for different
definitions of success for different initial conditions. We leave this
problem to future research.-14-
term of GDP share than in unsuccessful cases, despite the larger amount of
total spending cuts. In fact, only one fifth of total spending cuts in
successful cases are on public investment. The critical difference is that
in successful adjustments the largest cuts are on transfers and govement
wages, which together are almost 60 percent of the total spending cuts. In
successful adjustments transfer and government wages are reduced
1.2 percent of GDP per year, while in unsuccessful cases the sum
two components is less than 0.2 percent of GDP per year.
Table 4. Successful and Unsuccessful Adjustments:
Expenditures and Revenues l_/
by almost
of these
Number of Fiscal Primary
Observations Impulse Expenditures Revenues
Successful adjustments 16 -2.92 -2.12 0.83
(0.28) (0.29) (0.36)
Unsuccessful adjustments 46 -2.44 -1.07 1.36
(0.24) (0.28) (0,16.)
Source: OECD .
~ All the variables are in changes of ratios over GDP. Standard
deviations in parentheses.-15-
Tab LB5. Successful andUnsuccessful Adjustments: Composition ofExpendit~e Cuts ~/
Number of Priman Public Gove-ant Nonw~&e Public
Obsemat~ons Escpendi LurasInvestmentTransfers Wages Co~sumptLOn Subsidies
Successful adjustments 16 -2.12 -0.43 -0.48 -0.58 -0.30 ‘0.27
(0.29) (0.16) (0.18) (0.08) (0.06) (0.18)
Wsuccassful adjustments 46 -1.07 -0.60 -0.14 -0.05 ‘0.06 -0.08
(0.29) (0.30) (0.08) (0.06) (0.03) (0.05)
Source: OECD. See Appendix fora precise definition ofvariables.
~[ A.L1 varisbles areinchanges ofEatioa overGDP. Standard deviations inparentheses
Table 6. Successfulaud Unsuccessful Adjus~ents:GampositLam of
Expenditure CutsasSharea ofTotal Expenditure Cuts
Public Governcoant NanwagaGovt. ‘
Number of Investment Transfers Wages columns Consumption Subsidies
Observations (1) (2) (3) (2)+(3) (4) (5)
Successfuladjustments 16 -0.20 -0.23 -0.2s -0.51 -0.14 -0.13
(0.07) (0.09) (0.04) (0.03) (0.08)
Unsuccessfuladjustments 46 -0.63 -0.13 -o.o& -0.17 -0.06 -0.07
(0.28) (0,07) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05)
SOurca: OECD. Computationsfrom Table 5. Standarddeviationsin parentheses.-16-
Cuts in the government wage bill may arise from lower wages and from
lower employment. Table 7 considers government employment. This
table shows that while during successful adjustments the growth of
government employment significantly drops, during unsuccessful adjustments
the rate of growth of the same variable is about the same as before and
after. These observations hold both for government employment alone for the
same variable as a share of the labor force.
In other words, Tables 5, 6, and 7 paint the following picture:
Successful adjustments are based on broad-based spending cuts which do not
spare the most politically sensitive parts of the budget; namely, transfers,
social security and government wages and employment, which in fact receive
the largest share of expenditure reductions. On the contrary, unsuccessful
adjustments concentrate most of their cuts on capital expenditures, probably
for two reasons. First, the effects of cuts in public investment, such as
postponing maintenance of infrastructure or delaying new capital projects is
less immediately visible to voters than cuts in their salaries or pensions
checks. ~ Second, “creative accounting” is probably easier in the
capital accounts. ~
Tables 8 and 9 display the composition of tax increases. In successful
adjustments tax increases are concentrated on business and on indirect
taxes. The increase in business taxes may be due to a larger base rather
than to higher rates. In fact, we show below that the profit share tends to
increase in successful adjustments. Taxes on households do not increase at
all and social security contributions are also spared almost completely. On
the contrary the tax increase of unsuccessful adjustments are widely spread
on all components. The contrast between cases of success and failure is
particularly striking for taxes on households and social security. The
total share of tax increases of these two components is about 90 percent in
successful cases and less than 45 percent in unsuccessful cases. AS shown
in Alesina and Perocti (1994 and 1995b) and discussed above, these two types
of taxes, on households, and social security contributions, have the
strongest effects on unit labor costs, via union behavior. AS we show in
the next subsection, the pattern of unit labor costs is, in fact, very
~ See Rogoff (1990) for an insightful discussion of political cycles on
the budget composition, where opportunistic policymakers cut public
investment before elections because they are less visible to voters than
transfers.
2_/ See our discussion on Italy below, Tanzi (199L), and Alesina, Mare,
and Perotti (1996).-17-
different in successful”versus unsuccessful adjustments, and may contribute
to explain difference in the macroeconomic consequences of fiscal
adjustments.
Table 7. Government Employment in Successful and
Unsuccessful Adjustments ~
Succe s U1 ~
Before During titer Before During After
Rate of growth of 3.01 0.91 2.52 2.81 2.18 2.32
govt. employment (0.36) (0.79) (1.19) (0.40) (0.32) (0.46
Rate of growth of 1.41 0.29 1.04 1.79 1.22 1.34




v “Before” is the yearly average of the No-year before the fiscal
adjustment; “during” is the one-year or yearly average of the two-year
adjustment period; “after” is the yearly average of the two-year period
after the adjustment. Standard deviations in parentheses.
TsbLa a. Successfulsod UnsuccessfulQustisnta:
Compositionof Incraasesin Rav~uas
Numbac Taxes on Taxmmon Indirect socialsecurity
of Ohs Revenues Households Business T-ma Contributions
successful 16 0.83 0.00 0.51 0.20 0.09
adjustments (0.36) (0.23) (0.22) (0.12) (0.19
Unsuccessful 46 1.36 0.35 0.29 0.43 0.31
adjustments (0.16) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09
Source: OECD. See Appendixfor s q ore precisedefinitionof all variables. Standarddeviationsin
parenthasen.-18-
Table 9. Successfuland UnsuccessfulAdjustments: Compass Lion of
Tax Increasasas a Share of Total T= Increasas
Numbez of Taxes on Taxas on Indirect SocialSecurity
Obsarvaeions Households Business Tsxes Contributions
Successful 16 0.00 0.62 0.26 0.10
adJustiants (0.27) (0.26) (0.14) (0.23
Unsuccessful 46 0.25 0.21 0.32 0,23
adjustments (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07
Source: OECD. Computationsfrom TsbLa E. Standarddeviationsin parentheses.
3. Macroeconomic consequences of fiscal adjustments
Table 10 summarizes some basic statistics before, during, and in the
immediate aftermath of successful and unsuccessful adjustments. The term
“before” refers to the two-year period before the beginning of the tight
policy. The term “after” refers to the two-year period after the last year
of the tight fiscal policy. The term “during” is the year or the two-year
period of the fiscal adjustment. All the variables in the table are yearly
averages.
The rate of GDP growth, measured in differences from the G-7 average
(for obvious reasons) shows large differences between successful and
unsuccessful cases. During successful adjustments growth is more than
1 percent above G-7 average and this difference is statistically signif-
icant; afte~ard, growth falls but it still above G-7 average . On the
contrary,during and after unsuccessful adjustments growth remains below G-7
average. Interestingly, before successful adjustments growth is not higher
(relative to G-7) than before unsuccessful adjustments; in fact it is
slightly lower. This observation suggests adjustments are not successful
simply because they are started in a period of high growth.
Unemployment relative to G-7 after a successful adjustment is at about
the same level as before it. After an unsuccessful one, unemplopent
relative to G-7 has doubled, from less than 1 percent above G-7 average to
almost 2 percent above the same average.
The rate of growth of private investment shows a sizable difference
between the two types of adjustments. An investment boom occurs during and
after the successful adjustments. In unsuccessful cases the rate of growth
of investment falls during and after the adjustment, relative to before and
it is much lower than in successful cases. The cumulative growth rate of
investment during and after successful adjustments is about 25 percent,-19-
while it is only about 8 percent during and after unsuccessful cases. The
rate of growth of consumption does not show large differences between the
two types of adjustments. These last two observations are intriguing, since
the academic literature (theoretical and empirical) has typically focused on
consumption much more than on investment.
Nominal and ex post real long interest rates, relative to G-7, do not
show strong differences between the two types of adjustments, although
nominal rates do fall during successful adjustments relative to before, and,
instead, they increase during unsuccessful ones.
Very interesting observations emerge from the evidence on unit labor
costs and measures of competitiveness, First of all, the data on relative
unit labor costs show large differences between successful and unsuccessful
cases . Relative unit labor costs significantly fall before and during
successful cases while they are about constant in unsuccessful ones. The
cumulative fall before and during successful cases is more than 10 percent.
The behavior of relative unit labor costs can be influenced by two
factors: a depreciation of the nominal exchange rate in an economy with
nominal rigidities, and a containment of wage pressure. As Table 10 shows,
both successful and unsuccessful adjustments have been accompanied and
preceded by nominal depreciations, somewhat larger in successful cases.
However, significant depreciations accompanied unsuccessful adjustments as
well, What is interesting is than while in successful cases the nominal
depreciations had an impact on competitiveness (unit labor costs) in
unsuccessful cases it did not. These obsenations suggest that the behavior
of real wages is significantly different in the two types of adjustments. “As
argued above, this difference may be linked to the composition of the fiscal
adjustment, and in particular to the difference in the behavior of govern-
ment wages and employment and taxes on households and social security
contributions. The evidence on the trade balance confirms the superior
performance of net exports in successful versus unsuccessful adjustments.
The last three columns of Table 3 display an index of profitability and
distributional shares. An index of the value added deflator over unit labor
costs (VAULC) shows a rather different behavior in successful and
unsuccessful adjustments. In the former group one obsenes a significant
increase in this index of profitability during the adjustments, while in
unsuccessful cases the same index is constant. The behavior of real wages,
unit labor costs, and profitability also has clear implications on the
distributional shares, While the wage share goes down by about 3 points,
and the profit share increases by about 2 points during successful
adjustments , these two shares are virtually constant in unsuccessful cases.-20-
Table 10. Successfulend UnsuccessfulAdjustments:
MacroeconomicCandition~~
Successful Unsuccessful

























































































































































&/ “Befora”is tie two-yearperiod before the adjua-tsnt. ‘“During- is the adjustmentpariad. ..~te=n
is the two-yearperiod after the ad~ustment. GS (G-7) is the yearlyavaragagrowthof GDP relativeto the
G-7 avarage,waigbted byGDP. U (G-7) iatheuumplo~~ntrata relativeto G-7 averaga. AI ia the yearly
rate of growthof private invaabent. AC is the averageyearly rate of growth of conaumptian. i(G-7) la
a nominal long-terninteraatrata (10-yaargovernmentbond) relahiveto G-7 avarage. r (G-7) ia the real
long interestrate cr.mputad as [i(G-7)-inflmtion, relativato G-7]. WC is the yearly rate of chnngeof
relativaunit l~or coats. ~CH RATE in tha rate of change of the nominaleffectivelxchange rate. VAULC
is the rate of changeof the valua addad daflatorOver ~it laborcosts;WSEI is the wags shara ovar GDP
and PSE is the profit share over GDP. See Appendixfor e more pracisedefinitionof nll of these
variablaa. Standarddeviationsin parentheses.
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This table suggests that perhaps the strongest channel influencing the
macroeconomic consequences of fiscal adjustment goes through unit labor
costs , via their effects on investment and exports; this channel may be at
least as important, if not more, than the channels typically emphasized in
the literature, based upon “wealth effects cum expectations” on consumption
and credibility effects on consumption. The discussion which follows in the
next section concerning three case studies sheds some more light on this
issue.
Needless to say, Table 10 is far from conclusive and much more
statistical evidence is necessary to disentangle various charnels through
which fiscal adjustments can influence the economy. In particular, several
critical issues need to receive more attention:
(i) More work is needed to disentangle the effects of exchange rate
depreciations and wage moderation on the likelihood of success of fiscal
adjustments . One interpretation of the evidence presented above is that the
composition of successful adjustments induces wage moderation, while the
composition of unsuccessful ones does not. A critical exhibit in favor of
this interpretation is the fact that during successful adjustments goven-
ment wages are cut and gove-ent employment does not increase much, while
at the sae time taxes on household are constant. According to the models
and the empirical
evidence presented by Alesina and Perotti (1994 and 1995b) and Perotti and
Lane (1996), these features should imply wage moderation on the part of the
unions . On the contrary, the features of unsuccessful adjustments,namely
higher increase in taxes and no cuts on government wages and employment have
the opposite effects on unit labor costs. However, several major multi year
fiscal adjustments (see next section) are preceded by a devaluation of the
exchange rate. Disentangling the effects of wage moderation and the effects
of fiscal variables on the supply side and the cost of firms, versus the
effect of the exchange rate is a critical next step to understand the
dynamics of fiscal adjustments.
(ii) Table 10 shows that growth is significantly higher during
successful adjustments than during unsuccessful ones. Our favorite
interpretation is that the composition of the adjustment through its
credibility, wealth, and, especially, unit labor cost effects influences
growth. An alternative interpretation is that successful adjustments are
such because growth is, for some exogenou reason, particularly high during
these episodes. wile our evidence camot be conclusive on this point, the
alternative interpretation which argues that growth explains success, fails
to provide an explanation of the difference in composition between
successful and unsuccessful adjustments. If everything is driven by
exogenous growth effects, than successful and unsuccessful adjustments
should look approximately the same in terms of their composition.-22-
4. Sensitivity and comparisons with urevious results
Sensitivity analysis on our results shows that they are robust to
changes in the definitions. For instance,we have relaxed the definition of
success as follows:
Definition 3: A period of tight fiscal policy is successful if either
one of the following two conditions applies: (i) the average cyclically
adjusted primary deficit as a share of GDP is on average lower than in the
last year of the tight policy, and (ii) tie debt to GDP ratio three years
after the last year of the adjustment is below the level of the last year of
the adjustment.
With this new definition we now have 38 observation/years of success,
corresponding to 28 episodes, and 24 obsenation years of failures.
Table 11 considers the difference in the composition of expenditure cuts and
tax increases and should be compared with table 4 above. The differences
between successful adjus~ents and unsuccessful ones are very similar to
those of Table 4, in fact they are slightly larger. Interestingly, the size
of the adjustment is virtually identical.
Table 12 considers the composition of spending cuts, and should be
compared with Table 6. The difference in composition remains striking.
Virtually all the adjustment in unsuccessful cases (84 percent of total
spending cuts) is on public investment, while transfers and government wages
slightly increase. In successful cases cuts of transfers and government
wages are about half of the total e~enditure reductions. The difference in
the composition of t= increases are qualitatively similar to those reported
above in Tables 8 and 9.
As for the qacroeconomic consequences, using this alternative defini-
tion of success we obtain results which are quite similar to those reported
in Table 10, although as should be expected, the difference between success
and failures are a bit smaller. The behavior of unit labor costs remain
the most striking difference between the two types of adjustments.
We also have relaxed our definition of what a “tight” policy is,
reducing (in absolute value) the threshold level for a definition of tight
policy. For instance, we have considered as “tight” episode any two-year
period where BFI is lower than -1, as opposed to -1.25 as in our
definition 1. Our results do not change qualitatively. Further experiments
combining different definitions of “tight episodes” and “success” confirm
the general robustness of our results. ~
~ All these results are available upon request.-23-
Also , a comparison with our previous results presented in Alesina and
Perotti (1995a) and (1996) confirms that the basic picture painted in this
section is quite robust, In our previous papers we have used a definition
of tight policy which included only one year adjustments. What we have done
here improves upon this definition by including two-year period of “moderate
adjustment” each year rather than only one year of sharp adjustment. We have
also improved upon our previous definition of success by focusing on the
flow of deficits rather than only on the stock of debt as a criterium of
success. Finally, in this paper we use an updated data set and we use only
obsemations with a full set of usable observations, Also we consider many
more macroeconomic variables and we make some progress toward disentangling
the macroeconomic effects of adjustments, particularly those related to the
external sector and exchange rate movements.
McDermott and Wescoct (1996) use a similar methodology to ours. Their
definitions are a combination of what we use in this paper and we used in
our previous work. Their definition of tight fiscal policy allows for two
or three year periods of consecutive tightening. Their definition of
success is based only on the improvement in the debt to GNP ratio. They
also use a different methodology for the cyclical adjustment. As far as the
composition is concerned they confirm our result on the spending side. This
is quite reassuring, given the several difference in their definitions and
procedures. They also have similar findings concerning the size of the
adjustment in successful and unsuccessful cases. They interpret this
finding as saying that the size of the adjustment is very important. We
still find the differences in the composition more impressive than the
difference in size, particularly in light of the results of Table 11,
Table 11. Successful and Unsuccessful Adjustment, Alternative
Definition, Expenditures and Revenues ~
Number of Fiscal Primary
Observations Impulse Expenditures Revenues
Successful adjustments
Unsuccessful adjustments
38 -2.61 -1.66 0.96
(0.17) (0.21) (0.19
24 -2.50 -0.84 1.64
(0.43) (0.46) (0.24
Source: OECD .
~/ All variables are in changes of ratios over GDP. Standard deviations
in parentheses.-24-
Table 12. Successfuland UnsuccessfulAdjustments,AlternativeDefinition,
ExpenditureCuts as a Share of Total Zxpendit.reCuts
Public Government Nonwage Gove.
Number of Investment Transfers Wages Colunn’ls Consumption Subsidies
Observations (1) (2) (3) (2)+(3) (4) (5)
Successful 38 -0.33 -0.24 -0.19 -0.43 -0.10 -0.09
adjustments (0.09) (0.06) (0.04) (0.02) (0.05
Unsuccessful 24 ‘0.84 0.03 0.04 0.07 -0.08 -0.11
adjustments (0.64) (0.12) (0.11) (0.06) (0.10
Source: OECD. Stsndarddeviationsin parentheses.
Using a rather different methodology, based upon estimating consump-
tion functiom, Giavazzi and Pagano (1996) argue that large and persistent
fiscal adjustments are expansionary , while smaller ones are not because of
credibility and wealth effects,
Bartolini, Razin, and Symansky (1995) use the MULTIMOD model to study
the effects of fiscal adjustments in the G-7 countries. They find that
adjustments have short-run output cost and long run benefits. However,
adjustments relying on increases in indirect taxes and expenditures have a
quicker recovery relative to other types of adjustments, a result which is
quite consistent with our evidence presented above.
v. Three Maior Fiscal Adjustments
In the previous sections we have argued that one can identify two types
of fiscal adjustments. Type 1 adjustments rely primarily on spending cuts;
the components of spending which receive the largest cuts are transfer
programs and govement employment and wages. Furthermore, in these
adjustments taxes on households are kept constant, or even reduced. Type 2
adjustments rely primarily on tax increases, particularly on households and
spending cuts in public investment. We have shown that Type 1 adjustments
are more permanent and expansionary, while T~e 2 tend to be reversed by
further deteriorations of the budget and have worse macroeconomic
consequences .
In this section we argue that the Irish adjustment in the late eighties
(1986 to 1989) is of Type 1; instead, the Danish adjustment of 1983-86 has
substantially different features from the Irish one and lies somewhere in
between Type 1 and Type 2. Finally, we suggest that the current Italian
adjustment is of Type 2, at least up until 1995.-25-
1. The Irish adjustment 1987-89
Ireland entered the 1980s with a serious fiscal problem: the borrowing
requirement was nearly 16 percent of GNP. In 1982-84 a weak and divided
coalition government engaged in a fiscal adjustment almost completely on the
revenue side. In particular, taxes on households were sharply raised. The
only modest spending cuts were on public investment. This looks like a
“textbook case” of “Type 2“ adjustment. The Irish pound was pegged to EMS
currency leading to a rapid disinflation with falls in interest rates,
however the stabilization failed to permanently consolidate the budget and
had very strong negative effects on domestic demand. The fiscal balance
continued to deteriorate in 1984-86, mostly due to increases in the interest
burden and of primary spending; the latter grew by about 2 percentage points
of GDP in these three years.
In 1987, the gross debt/GDP ratio peaked at almost 120 percent. A new
government elected in February of that year launched an adjustment program
with totally different features from the failed one of the early eighties.
This adjustment lead to a sharp drop in the debt to GDP ratio in the
following five years (from almost 120 percent to slightly more than
90 percent) and to rates of growth well above OECD or G-7 averages. The
turnaround of the Irish economy started in 1987 is remarkable.
a. Size and composition of the adjustment
Table 13 smarizes several features of the Irish adjustment. Our
measure of cyclically adjusted primary surplus (BFI) improves by about
8 percent of GDP from 1985-86 to 1990-90. The entire adjustment is on the
spending side. The only moderate increase in household taxes during the
adjustment is entirely due to a one off tax amnesty in 1988. Total revenues
(including taxes on households) as a share of GDP were lower in 1989-90 than
in 1986.
The spending cuts were broad ranging but the largest in terms of share
of GDP were on transfers, which fell by more than 2.5 percent of GDP. The
government wage bill and public investment received the second largest
reduction. Reductions in goverment wages were obtained by an agreement in
1987 with the unions to limit pay increase to 2.5 percent, well below
inflation. More important was the large reduction in public employment.
Between 1986 and 1989 total public employment was cut by about 10 percent,
from 300,000 to 270,000. This development was the result of an hiring
freeze instituted in 1987, early retirement schemes, and voluntary
redundancy schemes. ~/ Social spending cuts were mostly in the health
sector.
~/ In order to facilitate voluntary resignations, the Government
sponsored retraining programs designed to help individuals leave the public
sector. These relatively cheap programs were quite successful.-26-
Table 13. Ireland: Fiscal Adjustment Size and Composition, 1987-89 ~
Before During After Diff. Diff.





Nonwage public consumption 7.4
Public investment 3.6
Revenues 35.9
Taxes on households 12.9

















































u “Before” is the two-year period before the adjustment, thus 1985-86;
“during” is the period of the adjustment, 1987-89; “after” is the two-year
period after the adjustment, thus 1990-91. All variables are in shares of
GDP .
b. Tax reform and wa~e bar~aining
In 1988 a broad tax reform was introduced and took effect in 1989. A
cornerstone of it was a cut in marginal tax rates on the income of
households. The top rate which was as high as 65 percent in 1984-85 was
reduced to 56 percent, but also the standard rate was cut from 35 percent to
32 percent. These cuts were accompanied by an increase in standard allow-
ances . The Irish tax system is quite progressive, therefore these tax cuts
reached very low in the income ladder. The corporate income tax was also
reduced from 47 to 43 percent.-27-
Wage bargaining had a decentralized nature throughout the eighties. On
the contrary, a centralized wage agreement was reached in 1987 in the
context of the Program For National Recovery (PNR). The accord covering
1988-90 insured wage moderation both in the private and in the public
sector. A very large majority of firm level wage agreements were in line
with the guidelines established by the accord between the government and the
national union. We claim that this tax reform and the wage bargaining
agreements are not unrelated. As argued in the previous section, wage
moderation was achieved probably because the unions internalized the
increase in the after tax disposable income due to the tax cuts, in addition
to the effects of a soft labor market with high unemplo~ent. Also the qore





union’ moderation at the bargaining table.
Macroeconomic consequences of the adjustment
year 1987 marks a remarkably positive turnaround for the Irish
Unemployment started to decrease in 1988 after a rising trend which
had lasted 25 years. Table 14 shows that growth which was almost 2 percent
below G-7 average before the adjustment was well above G-7 average during
and after the adjustment. GDP growth was sustained by both domestic and
foreign factors. Domestic consumption grew at steady rates during and
after the adjustment, mostly due to consumer durables, particularly
automobiles. Private investment increased and picked up the
the contracting public investment, The ex~ernal sector was
devaluation of the Irish pound of 1987 and by the policy of





Nominal and real rates fell dramatically between 1987 and 1989 both in
absolute terms and relative to Germany. Short-term real rates (defined as
nominal minus actual inflation) fell from about 11 percent at the end of
1986 to about 7 percent in 1989. Differential of these rates with Germany
fell from about 7 in 1986 to about 3 in 1989. Similar developments occurred
on long rates, with a differential of real rates respect to Germany falling
from about 5 in 1986 to about 2 in 1989. These developments are an indica-
tion of credibility effects in asset markets, as pointed out by Dornbusch
(1989) .
The increase in market value of private wealth due to the fall in
interest rates generated a positive wealth effect in consumption. AS noted
by Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) an effect on liquidity constrained
individuals , who obtained an increase in disposable income due to the tax
cuts , was a second source of the increase in private consumption. Interest-
ingly, most of the increase in consumption came from durables, perhaps
implying a strong interest rate effect.
All indicators of competitiveness show marked improvements between 1986
and 1989. For instance, IMF staff calculations of relative unit labor costs
fell by a cumulative 15 percent in this period. Our measure of relative
unit labor costs fell by about 10 percent in the same period. These develop--28-
ments are the result of the combined effect of wage moderation and the
devaluation of the Irish pound. The trade balance improved during the
adjustment despite the booming domestic demand (Table 14).
The effect of wage moderation is apparent in the evolution of
distributional shares (see Table 14). The wage share fell from about
54 percent before the adjustment to about 50 afterward, while the profit
share gained about five points in the same period. IMF Staff calculation of
profitability also show a sharp improvement in ten same period. For instance
the ratio of wholesale prices over unit labor costs increased by more than
20 percent between 1986 and 1989. The ratio of export unit value over unit
labor costs displays a similar pattern.
Table 14, Ireland: Macroeconomic Conditions
and the Fiscal Adjustment, 1987-89
(1) (2) (3)









































Source: OECD . For a definition of the variables see Table 10.
2. The Danish adjustment 1983-86
The fiscal position of Denmark deteriorated rapidly starting in the
late 1970s, reaching the highest deficits in 1982: in that year the central
goverment deficit was more than 11 percent of GDP. The worsening of the-29-
fiscal balance was entirely due to a sharp increase in expenditures, from
about 44 percent of GDP in 1978 to almost 54 percent in 1982. The gross
debt/GDP ratio reached almost 80 percent in 1982, and a large fraction of it
(by OECD standard) was foreign debt. u Average bond yield peaked at
about 20 percent in 1982, when inflation was about 9 percent. The real rate
differential between Denmark and Germany was about 8 percent in 1982. In
October 1982 S&P added a credit watch to the W rating of Danish government
bonds .
In October 1982 a convincing electoral victory established a cohesive
conservative coalition into office. This government launched a major fiscal
adjustment program which took place in the following four years. At the
same time the goverment announced that the exchange rate was irrevocably
fixed and the series of devaluations in the previous years had ended. As
pointed out by Giavazzi and Pagano (1990), the credibility of this announce-
ment was cemented by the lack of a Danish devaluation in March 1983, at the
time of a general EMS realignment.
a. Composition of the adjustment
Table 15 shows that the turnaround of Danish fiscal position was
remarkable: the largest in the recent history of any OECD economy. By
1987/88 our cyclically adjusted measure of budget deficit improved by more
than 11 percent of GDP relative to 1981/82. The adjustment was about
equally divided between expenditure cuts and tax increases,
On the expenditure side most of the cuts were on transfer programs and
government wages (see Table 15). Cuts in transfer programs were broad
ranging and focused on unemployment insurance (freezing of maximum rate and
reduction of abuses), changes in the parameter of pensions schemes,
particularly on public employees, cuts in sickness insurance funds.
Transfer to local governments were also reduced in 1983-85. As shown in
Table 15 transfers fell by more than 1 percent of GDP during the adjustment.
Public employment which had been growing rapidly before 1982, was frozen.
In the context of the income policies introduced in 1982, government sector
wages grew less than inflation. Wage indexation was suspended until 1987,
and the automatic link of public sector wages to wage increases in the
private sector was eliminated. The result of all these measures was a
substantial reduction in the government wage bill.
On the revenues side, most of the increase in revenues was due to
direct taxes on household and business, with more modest increases in
indirect taxes (Table 15). In che context of the policy of cuts in net
transfers, several social security contribution were increased, including
contribution from employees to che unemployment fund and tax subsidies to
private pension schemes. The result was a substantial increase in the tax
burden for families in the period 1982-87.
~ External debt was about 35 percent of GDP.-30-
b. Macroeconomic’consequences of the fiscal adjustment
The average growth rate during the adjustment in 1983-86 was about
3.3 percent per year, well above the G-7 average (Table 16). Both
consumption and especially private investment boomed. The latter grew by
more than 10 percent per year and the former by more than 3 percent. The
share of private investment grew by almost 2.5 points of GDP relative to
1981/82. Export increased steadily as a result of improvements of competi-
tiveness (reduction of relative unit labor costs), due in part to the
depreciation of the exchange rate in the early 1980s and to the wage
moderation accord of 1982, coupled with a suspension of indexation clauses.
The effect of this wage policy is reflected in Table 16 in a sharp drop of
the wage share and an even larger increase in the profit share in the period
1983-86 relative to the previous two years.
Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) emphasize the expansionary consequences of
the “credibility effect” and of the “wealth effect” in these four years.
Interest rates dramatically fell immediately after the fiscal adjustment was
announced and the implementation started. Giavazzi and Pagano (1990)
calculate that their measure of an ex ante real rate fell from 6.7 in the
1979-82 period to 3.3 for the 1983-86 period of fiscal adjustment.
Differential with real German rates were at least halved, dropping from
about 8 percent to less than 4 percent. Table 16 also shows a sharp drop of
ex post real rates relative to G-7, from almost 5 before the adjustment to
less than 2 during, to less than 1.5 after. Another indicator of the
credibility of the adjustment was a jump upward of indicators of consumer
confidence.
The sharp drop in real interest rates, accompanied by the wage
moderation achieved in 1982, the increase in the profit share and the
reduction in unit labor costs all contributed to the boom in private
investment.
c. Immediate aftermath
Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) interpret the Irish and the Danish
adjustments as two cases of expansionary fiscal consolidations, and
emphasize their similarities. However, the immediate aftermath of the two
adjustments show that they were quite different. While the Irish economy
continued booming after the adjustment, the Danish economy turned into a
recession in 1987 and 1988 with growth rates of -.6 and -.2, respectively:
average growth in Denmark was more than 3 percent lower than in the G-7 in
both 1987 and 1988 (Table 16). In 1989 growth was only 1.1 percent.
Unemplopent increased in 1988 from 7.9 to 8.7 an continued to climb in the
following two years. The Irish and Danish adjustments look quite different.-31-
Table 15. Denmark: Adjustment Size and Composition, 1983-86 ~
Before During After Diff. Diff.





































































w “Before” is the two-year period before the adjustment, thw 1981-82;
“during” is the period of the adjusunent, 1983-86; ‘after” is the two-year
period after the adjustment, thus 1987-89. All variables are in shares of
GDP.
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Table 16. Denmark: Macroeconomic Conditions
and the Fiscal Adjustment, 1983-86
Before During After Diff Diff































































Source: OECD . For a definition of the variables see Table 10.
The underlying cause of the Danish recession lies in the fall in
competitiveness. The real effective exchange rate (relative unit labor
costs) as measured by the IMF fell by 8 percent in 1986 and almost
11 percent in 1987. The current account deficit increased to almost
6 percent of GDP in 1986. The trade balance worsened during the adjustment,
as shown in Table 16, particularly in 1985-86. The improvement of the trade
balance after the adjustment is largely driven by the recession.
The decrease in competitiveness can only be partially explained by the
appreciation of the real exchange rate due to the rapidly falling inflation
with a fixed nominal rate. An important additional factor was the wage
agreement of early 1987, which introduced sizeable wage increases for 1987
and 1988. Their effects, after the restraint during the period 1982-86, is
shown in Table 16 by a rebound of the wage share which increased by more
than 1 point of GDP relative to the average of 1983-86. The profit share,
on the contrary fell of about 2 percentage points.-33-
Our interpretation is that the wage accord of 1987 incorporated union
demands for compensations for the increase in income taxes of the previous
four years, which reduced workers’ after tax income. Thus , the tax
increases might have been the originating cause of the recession, via wage
negotiations, as implied by Alesina and Perotti (1994).
3. The Italian adjustment from 1989
The beginning of a fiscal adjustment in Italy can de dated back to
1989. However, despite the reduction in the primary deficit which turned
into a surplus in 1991, the debt to GNP ratio continued to increase reaching
125 percent in 1994. Only in 1995 this ratio declined slightly. Until 1993
the adjustment was completely on the revenue side. In fact the ratio of
primary spending over GNP increased between 1989 and 1993. Thus, the
adjustment between 1989 and 1993 looks clearly of “T~e 2.” From 1993 to
1995 primary spending was cut and revenues fell. Thus, at first sight, one
may be tempted to conclude that from 1993 onward, the Italian adjustment is
of Type 1, However, a more careful examination of the evidence suggests
that this interpretation is questionable.
a. Size and composition of the adjustment
Table 17 considers the general government, the definition which is the
most compatible with the one used for the other countries in this
study, ~ First of all, the overall size of the adjustment, from 1994-95
relative to 1989 is much smaller than the one of Denmark and Ireland,
despite being stretched over a longer period. In terms of share of GDP the
adjustment in the primary surplus is about half of the Irish adjustment and
not more than one third of the Danish adjustment, despite the fact that
Italy had a much higher debt to GDP ratio of Denmark and a much higher
interest burden. Until 1993 the adjustment was totally on the revenue side,
with revenues increasing of 6.3 per cent of GDP and reaching 48.3 percent.
Primary expenditures rose of 3.7 percent of GDP. Total expenditures reached
57.8 percent in 1993. After the spending and tax cuts of 1994 and 1995,
primary expenditures returned to their 1989 level as a share of GDP, and
revenues are still 3.5 percent of GDP above the 1989 level. The reduction
in revenues in the last two years is largely due to the fact that many of
the tax increases in 1992-93 had a “one off” nature.
~ Fiscal data for Italy are drawn from IMF, specifically from the latest
RED and its appendices (March 1996). Since data for 1995 are particularly
important for the Italian adjustment, we could not use our OECD data set,
which we adopted above, since that data ends at 1994. Also, for the case of
Italy, it is particularly useful to contrast the central government data
with the general government data.-34-
Table 17. Italy: Fiscal Adjustment General Government, 1989-95
Diff, Diff. Diff.






















































































The composition of”the spending cuts in 1994-95 is quite revealing.
The largest share of the cut comes from capiral expenditures (1.1 percent of
GDP) . The remaining cuts between 1993 and 1994-95 are mostly from
govement wages (almost 1 percent of GDP) and other modest cuts on all the
other items. However, despite these recent cuts, in 1995 government wages
have about the same share of GDP, as in 1989, and social security increased
by 1.5 percent of GDP, relative to that same year.
The fall in public investment is partly (or largely) due to the effects
of criminal investigations known as “mani pulite” (clean hands) and it is
unlikely that these cuts will be sustainable. Certainly a good portion of
this reduction has a “one shot” nature. A sizable part (0.6 percent of GDP)
of the total cuts on the capital spending accounc falls in the category of
“other capital spending.” This entry includes refunds of tax credits of the
public. In 1993 this entry was unusually high (2.1 of GDP). In 1995
although almost 1 percent of GDP of tax refunds were planned
(Lit 16,000 billion) only Lit 700 billion was disbursed. On average about
Lit 5,000 billion is disbursed every year.
refund in 1995 is largely responsible for a
in capital spending.
The reduction of the wage bill results
especially from a less than full adjustment
Thus, the postponement of tax
large part of the so-called cut
form a hiring freeze, but
of public wages to inflation. An
agreement with the unions in 1992 linked wages to planned rather than actual
inflation. Since in the following three years actual inflation has been
above planned, real wages have fallen. Currently the unions ar asking for
an adjustment to wages to compensate for this difference. Whether this
adjustment will occur in full in the next few years is unclear. The point is
that the real wage reduction is the result of a rather convoluted and
(perhaps) strategic use of projected and actual inflation rather than a
clear and permanent agreement with the unions for a wage restraint. ~
Social security received some cuts in 1995 relative to 1996, As
pointed out by the Bank of Italy (1996) these savings have a temporary
nature and are due mostly to two “one off” measures: (i) some temporary
suspensions of “liquidazioni” (severance pay) of public employees and some
other postponement of payments of certain pensions, (ii) postponement from
November of 1995 co January of 1996 of indexation payments.
While the concept of general government is the most relevant for
international comparisons (and for the EMU criteria) the budget documents in
Italy , the authorities’ goals and most of the parliamentary discussion
refer to the State Sector (central government) . Table 18 summarizes some
statistic on the fiscal adjustment in the State Sector. While the trends of
general revenues and expenditures are similar to those of the general
government, an important observation concerns the composition of the
~/ See Alesina, Mare, and Perotti (1996) for a discussion of the
persistent bias in government’s forecasts of inflation.-36-
Table 18. Italy{ Fiscal Adjustment Central’ Government, 1989-95
Diff. Diff,
1909 1993 1994-95 1994-95/93 1994-95/89
Revenues 30.8 34.8 31.7 -3.1 0.9
~endit.res 41.5 44.5 40.1 -4.4 -1.4
Interestpayment 8.7 11.7 10,6 -1.1 1.9
Primary expenditures 32.8 32.8 29,4 -3.4 -3.4
Wages S.6 5.7 5.7 0.0 0.1
Pensions 1.6 1.9 2.1 0.2 0.5
Goods end senices 1.7 1.7 1.4 -0.3 -0.3
Transfersto public
antities 15.0 lL.1 13.1 -1.0 -1.9
Other transfars 4.0 4.7 4.0 -0.7 0.0
Capital e~sinditures 3.1 3.0 1,8 -1.2 -1.3
Ouerall balmca -10.7 -10.0 -8.4 -1.6 -2.3
Priman balance -2.0 1.8 2.3 0.5 4.3
Source: IMP.
spending cuts in 1994-95. The entire cuts are on two items: capital
spending and transfers to regional and municipal governments. We discussed
above the likely “one off” nature of the capical spending cuts. The drastic
cuts to local govermencs are likely to generate either some local tax
increases or more creative accounting at the local level to hide
liabilities. The tax autonomy of local government is currently quite
limited but it is increasing. The second problem is more serious. The
local health units (“unita’ sanitarie locali”) are a source of large hidden
liabilities. Thus , these cuts in transfers to local authorities may
reappear sooner or later as liabilities of the general government. M
~/ For example see Tanzi (1994) and Alesina, Mare, and Perotci (1996) for
some discussion of these creative accounting practices.-37-
b. Pension reform
In 1995 the Italian government adopted a comprehensive reform of the
pension system, one of the least solvent of the OECD. This reform, which
follows a previous adjustment of 1992, replaces an income-based system with
one that links benefits to contributions, although the system retains a
“pay-as-you-go” nature. The reform also eliminated seniority pensions,
which essentially permitted early retirement without penalties. In this
paper we are only interested in the effects of this reform on the current
fiscal adjustment and on its effecc on long run cuts in spending.
The estimates for the budget impact of the reform in the short medium
and long run are very difficult because they are based on uncertain
predictions of macroeconomic and demographic variables. However even the
most optimistic ones (from the Italian Treasury) suggest that the savings
both in the short run and in the long run are not very large. According to
the Italian Treasury, in the medium run (1995 to 2005) the reform would save
about 0.4 to 0.5 percent of GDP per year, equally split between reduced
spending and increased contributions. Peracchi and Rossi (1995) argue that
these estimates are over optimistic because they rely on not credible
forecasts. The most pessimistic estimates, form the Bank of Italy suggest
that the reform may even have a negative impact on the government budget,
even after the transition phase.
A recent ruling of the Constitutional Court concerning large pension
arrears implies a further negative fiscal shock on the pension system.
These payments will be financed with debt issues and should be about equal.
to the amount of savings of the pension reform as calculated by the Italian
Treasury for the next five years. In summary, the effects of the reform on
the budget are highly uncertain and even in the most optimistic scenarios
not very large. u
c. Cyclical versus discretionary adjustments
and one-off measures
After the negative growth in 1993, GNP growth in Italy was higher than
forecasted both in 1994 and 1995, 2.2 against a forecast of 1.4 and 3.2
against a forecast of 2.5 percent. An interesting question is how much of
the adjustment of 1994-95 was purely a cyclical phenomenon or was a result
of discretionary measures. Furthermore, it is obviously important to
disentangle which of che discretionary measures have a one off character and
~/ Concerning the short term fiscal adjustment, one of the problems of
the reform is the widely acknowledged very slow phase in period. IMF staff
calculations suggest that several relatively simple and politically feasible
measures to accelerate the phase in period could lead to additional savings
of about .50 percent of GDP in 1995 and slightly more in the following year.
Although not huge, this amount is far from trivial: it is larger than the
actual cuts in social securicy occurred in 1994-95.-38-
which ones are more permanent. Quite apart from the difficulties in
calculating cyclical adjustments, discussed in Section 111, in the case of
Italy an important consideration is the baseline against which the
adjustment is measured,
Typically, the Italian authorities make a comparison between the actual
budget of the state sector with the “bilancio tendenziale” that is, with the
budget at “unchanged legislation. ” Using this procedure, in 1995 an
impressive 2.4 percent of GDP is the improvement of the primary balance,
which arises from discretionary fiscal measures. One problem with these
calculations is that the criteria for the computation of the “bilancio
tendenziale” are obscure and depend on possibly questionable assumptions. A
more useful comparison is between the primary budget surplus of the State
Sector in 1995 relative to the surplus in 1994. According to the IMF staff
calculations , of the 2.4 increase in the primary surplus between these two
years, only .8 percent of GNP can be attributed to permanent discretionary
measures. The remaining 1.6 percent is about equally split between the
effect of higher than forecasted growth and inflation and one off measures.
Unfortunately, similar calculations are not available for previous
years and for the general government. However as far as 1995 is concerned,
the effect of the cycle and of one off measures should have the same order
of magnitude as for the state sector. Thus , when closely examined only a
small fraction of the 1995 improvement in the fiscal balance has a permanent
nature. ~
d. Contractionary or expansionary adjustment?
Table 19 clearly shows that the Italian fiscal adjustment is associated
with strong contractionary consequences on domestic demand, while the
external sectors contained the negative effect of domestic demand on growth.
The Italian growth rate shows a declining trend from 4.1 per in 1988 to -.7
in 1993. In the period 1989-94 the Italian growth rate is on average,
0.7 percent below the G-7 average. As shown in Table 19, private investment
literally collapsed in this period: in 1993 ic fell by about 18 percent!
This development is in sharp contrast with the case of Ireland and Denmark,
where private investment boomed during the adjustment. Growth in private
consumption was very sluggish and turned negative in 1993. At least until
1993 there is no sign that interest rates incorporated a “credibility gain
bonus.” The only “good news” for the economy in the period 1989-93 is the
reduction in unit labor costs, as shown in Table 19. In summary, until 1993
the Italian adjustment has all the features of a contractionary adjustment,
all driven by tax increases, without spending cuts.
l_/ This is why in Tables 16 and 17 we focus on an average of 1994 and
1995, which gives a better picture of the recent trend in the adjustment,
rather than focusing on 1995, which for many reasons discussed above,
appears as a rather “lucky” year.-39-
The recent developments of 1994-95 are also quite instructive, The
recession of 1993 was contained by a growth of almost 9 percent in export
volume. The rate of growth in 1994-95 was also almost exclusively driven by
the export sector. In 1994 and 1995 export volume grew at 10.7 and 13.6,
respectively, with a trade surplus of about 4 percent of GNP. These
external developments were driven mostly by the large real devaluation of
the exchange rate, equal to about 25 percent from September 1992 when the
Iira abandoned the EMS. A second factor influencing competitiveness was the
relative wage moderation achieved after 1993. Note that this wage moderation
coincided with the end of major tax increases. All the measure of
competitiveness indicate substantial gains for Italy in the last three
years, of the order of 20 percent, the largest amount in the OECD together
with Sweden.
The pattern of consumer confidence (Chart 1) closely follows the cycle.
Consumer confidence was very low during the recession of 1993 and bounced
back with the recovery of 1994. Despite the higher than expected growth of
1995, consumer confidence is slightly lower at the end of 1995 than in 1994.
It is difficult to see any significant effect of the fiscal adjustment on
consumer confidence.
Interest rate differential relative to Germany fell in 1993 from more
than 6 percent on 10-year government bonds to less than 3 percent at the end
of the year. By the beginning of 1995 this differential was back at almost
5 percent. The differential on 3-month treasury bills is about 4 percent,
the same level as at the beginning of 1993. This pattern indicates that the
market has doubts about the credibility and persistence of the fiscal
adjustment even after the 1994-95 spending cuts. This behavior of interest
rate differential is in sharp contrast with the Danish and Irish experience.
This evidence clearly points toward a clear conclusion: not only the
1989-93 fiscal adjustment negatively affected private demand, but the
1994-95 adjustment had the same effect and would have had negative growth
consequences if it had not been accompanied by a massive depreciation of
the real exchange rate. In summary, until 1993 the Italian adjustment is
certainly of “T~e 2“. Some of the spending cuts in 1995 seem to appear as
a “Type 1“ adjustment, but are too plagued by “one off” measures and are of
uncertain duration.
VI. Conclusion
The single most important idea that we hope the reader will remember
from this paper is that the composition of fiscal adjustments matters for
their likelihood of success and for their macroeconomic consequences. In
our view, the academic literature focuses too much on aggregate models
which disregard composition and distributional effects, Also, the
emphasis of the Maastricht criteria has shifted the discussion too much
toward simple arithmetics of primary surpluses, deficits and debt to GDP
ratios and away from “how” one cuts deficits to meet these criteria, as if
the “how” didn’t really matter. Instead, it does.-40-














































Source: OECD . For a definition of the variables see Table 10.
Rather than reviewing in detail our results we conclude by discussing
several open issues for further research:
(i) A fair amount of evidence suggests that, in some cases, fiscal
contractions can be expansionary. An important question is through which
channe 1. We have argued that models which emphasize the effect of the
composition of the adjustment on unit labor costs in unionized and open
economies are at least as relevant empirically as models which focus upon
credibility and wealth effects. This argument needs a more thorough
empirical investigation.
(ii) Even though we have made some steps toward linking the
composition of the budget to ics macroeconomic effects, one should
disaggregate more the government accounts. For instance, our variable
“transfers” which is quite important for our argwent, is still quite- 40a -
Chart 1
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(1) Data for August computed as average of July and September figures
until 1994.-41-
aggregate and includes social security, unemployment compensation, other
social assistance programs, etc. A more disaggregate study in a rnulti-
country sample should clarify which components of the “transfers” variable
are more important in determining the success or failure of adjustments.
(iii) A very important policy decision concerns the policy mix which
should accompany a major fiscal adjustment, particularly the exchange rate
policy. Several major successful adjustments have been preceded by deval-
uations, but the same happened for some of the unsuccessful ones. The
question is whether a devaluation helps in determining the success of the
adjustment and its macroeconomic consequences. We have hinted in our
paper that a devaluation may help, but it would not “do the trick” if the
composition of the adjustment did not have the features which we have
discussed at length. Further research on this topic not only is
fascinating from an academic perspective but has important policy
implications. For example, this issue has critical implications for the
effects of fiscal adjustments before or after a monetary union.
(iv) In our statistical analysis of the sample of OECD countries we
focused on the general gove~ent. An intriguing issue is the role of
local governments during major fiscal adjustments. Are the adjustments
typically carried trough the central govement? How do local gove-ents
participate in the effort? Is there a shifting of responsibility between
the two layers of government? Hints in the discussion of the Italian case
suggest that this might be an important area worth exploring.
(v) Finally, one may wonder why,policymakers are often hesitant in
engaging in vigorous fiscal adjustments of “Type l,” considering that the~
do not seem to have contractionary effects. Perhaps the answer lies in
their distributional effects. We hinted above that the functional
distribution of income is tilted in favor of profits during successful
adjustments . A more careful study of the distributional consequences of
major fiscal adjustments is an excellent topic of research.
In summary, the efforts toward fiscal adjustment that several OECD
countries are currently facing is strictly linked to rhe problem of
reforming the welfare state, whose weight has been increasing in the last
few decades. Any fiscal adjustment chat avoids dealing with the problems
of social security, welfare programs and inflated governnlent bureaucracies
is doomed to failure.-42- APPENDIX
Definition of Variables
1. Fiscal variables
All variables used are from OECD, unless otherwise indicated in the
text.
TWSFERS - Social security benefits + social assistance grants +
unfunded employee pension and welfare benefits + transfers to the rest of
the world + transfers to private nonprofit institutions se~ing households +
net casualty insurance premiums + other transfers.
PUBLIC INVESTMENT - Government cross fixed capital formation: The
outlays, purchases and own-account production of producers of government
services on additions of new durable goods (commodities) to their stocks of
fixed assets, ,.Excluded are the outlays of government services on durable
goods for military use.
GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION (divided into its wage component and nonwage
component) - The value of goods and senices produced for their own use on
current account, that is the value of their gross output less the sum of the
value of their commodity and noncommodity sales and the value of their own-
account capital formation which is not segregated to an industry. The value
of their gross output is equal to the sum of their intermediate consumption
of goods and services, compensation of employees, consumption of fixed
capital and indirect taxes.
SUBSIDIES: All grants on current account made by government to private
industries and public corporations.
DIRECT TAXES ON INCOME: Levies by public authorities at regular
intervals, except social security contributions, on income from emplo~ent,
property, capital gains, or any ocher source.
INDIRECT T~S: Taxes assessed on producers in respect of their
production, sale, purchase, or use of goods and se~ices, which they charge
to the expenses of production. Also included are import duties and the
operating surplus, reduced by the normal margin of profits of business
units, of fiscal and similar monopolies of government.
SOCIAL SECURITY CONTRIBUTIONS: Social security contributions received
by government.
For a more detailed discussion concerning the construction of a measure
of primary deficit and the cyclical adjustment, see the appendix of Alesina
and Perotti (1995a).-43- APPENDIX
2. Other variables
GR (G-7) = (yearly rate of GDP growth of each country year) - (average
GDP growth of G-7 countries with GDP weights)
U (G-7) - (unemplo~ent rate of each country year) - (average
unemplo~ent of G-7 countries with GDP weights)
AI - rate of growth of private business investment
Ac = rate of growth of private consumption
i (G-7) - (nominal interest rate on 10-year government bonds) -
(average nominal interest rate on 10-year government bonds in G-7 countries
with GDP weights)
r (G-7) - (nominal interest rate on 10-year goverfient bonds -
inflation) - (average real interest rate in G-7 countries with GDP weight).
The real interest rate in each of the G-7 countries is obtained as the
nominal rate minus inflation.
ULc “ rate of change of unit labor costs in manufacturing, as
calculated by Alesina and Perotti (1994) on OECD data.
EXCH RATE - rate of change of the nominal effective exchange rate
VAULC = rate of change of the value added deflator over unit labor
costs in manufacturing.
WSH - wage share.
PSH = profit share.-44-
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